Q I guess if — what I’m trying to understand is, if there was a real problem with regard to the particular statute in either the FBI’s legal analysis, or the Department’s legal analysis, with respect to that particular statute, why are FBI agents submitting affidavits that are relying upon a particular statute that has real potential legal problems, according to the DOJ analysis?

A So, as I explained before, there are potentially specific prosecutions that could theoretically be brought that might result in constitutional concerns. However, the statute is not constitutionally invalid on its face and there are many prosecutions that could be brought, theoretically, where intent is proven that would not pose constitutional problems. So, for example, in this particular case, had we had evidence of intent, it’s theoretically possible that we could have brought a prosecution, might have brought a prosecution under that statute. I’m not saying that’s, you know, what would have happened necessarily, but the statute is not — it is not the Department’s view, as I understand it, the statute is invalid for constitutional reasons in every circumstance. 

Q Did you believe that the statute required intent? 

A That was my understanding of the Department’s interpretation, yes. {Meaning the (f) section to this statute was deemed unconstitutional by Lynch because section (f) didn’t have the word, intent, in it. Loretta Lynch confirmed this in her testimony. However, I will show this is the first shell in the shell-game in the fraud of Comey and Lynch. In this report, DOJ/FBI: We show how-why Hillary & others should’ve been prosecuted. we do prove that Hillary Clinton showed intent to break the law.}

Q Knowledge would not have been — knowledge of the fact that passage of classified information over unsecure means would not have been one of the elements of an offense under 793? {The security clearance document that Clinton signed, had the 793 statute listed with other statutes.}

A So I don’t know. I’m not an expert in this area. I was not the lead lawyer on this case.{She was a supervisor for lawyers in the National Security Division of the FBI, and she can’t say, the sending of classified information over unsecured means is a breach of U.S. law? So in effect, Anderson is saying she might do the same thing by mistake or with intent. Anderson did sign the same security clearance document for her own security clearance.}

Q But I think you had testified previously that you consider yourself a national security expert. And this particular investigation is going through the Counterintelligence Division, as you indicated. And mishandling investigations, to my knowledge, are not few and far between, that the Department and the FBI are relatively accustomed to these types of investigations. So what I’m trying to understand is, if you have a statute that is often used by the FBI, you and your attorneys, I would think, would be relatively knowledgeable about the use of that particular statute. 

A So, as I testified, 793(f) has never been used, to my understanding. In fact, I’m not sure it was my testimony, but I think I agreed in response to a question that Mr. Baker asked me. So 793(f) has never been used before.{This statute has been used before, mainly to charge military personnel. The DOJ allowed the FBI to use this statute to secure warrants for Clinton’s server(s) and Anthony Wiener’s laptop computer. Anderson’s testimony appears to be, if a statute hasn’t been used before for prosecution, then it can’t be used. So, how does a new bill apply to anyone that Congress passes and sends to the President to be signed into a law?}

Q Are you aware of other — 

A I really don’t know how many occasions the issue has ever come up where there could be a fact pattern that was discussed and considered. But more broadly, my job responsibilities included overseeing the legal support to the — to — legal advice provided to the FBI on all counterterrorism investigations, counterintelligence investigations, and cyber investigations. And so no, I was not an expert on — on the specific category of mishandling violations or the particular statutes at issue. That was not my job. My job was to oversee those lawyers, those experts who handled those issues. And one of those experts was the lawyer who worked for me on that — on the Midyear Exam case.

Q So are statutes only good if they are used? 

A I don’t know what that means.{Wow!}

Q You just indicated that the statute had never been used. So does that, the fact that the statute — and I am not stipulating to that. But in the FBI’s analysis, I presume, the statute that you are referring to in terms of gross negligence had never been used. So what I am asking is, does that mean that statutes that are never used are no longer good law?

A No, not at all. That’s not — I was just trying to — you had — I thought you had misinterpreted what I had said in your question, and I was trying to — 

Q No. I think if part of the legal reasoning as to why the gross negligence statute was not used in terms of a potential prosecution of Mrs. Clinton, if one of the — if part of that rationale was that it had never been used, then, by extension, one might presume that other statutes that are on the books, if they aren’t being used, should not be ever considered as predication for a prosecution.

A That’s not — that was not the intent of my statement.